Abstract A finite field K is said to be weak for elliptic curve cryptography if all instances of the discrete logarithm problem for all elliptic curves over K can be solved in significantly less time than it takes Pollard's rho method to solve the hardest instances. By considering the GHS Weil descent attack, it was previously shown that characteristic two finite fields F q 5 are weak. In this paper, we examine characteristic two finite fields F q n for weakness under Hess' generalization of the GHS attack. We show that the fields F q 7 are potentially partially weak in the sense that any instance of the discrete logarithm problem for half of all elliptic curves over F q 7 , namely those curves E for which #E(F q 7 ) is divisible by 4, can likely be solved in significantly less time than it takes Pollard's rho method to solve the hardest instances. We also show that the fields F q 3 are partially weak, that the fields F q 6 are potentially weak, and that the fields F q 8 are potentially partially weak. Finally, we argue that the other fields F 2 N where N is not divisible by 3, 5, 6, 7 or 8, are not weak under Hess' generalized GHS attack.
The best general-purpose algorithm known for solving the ECDLP is Pollard's rho method [21, 20] which has a fully-exponential expected running time of √ πr/2 point additions. For a fixed field F q , maximum resistance to Pollard's rho method is attained by selecting an elliptic curve E for which r is prime and as large as possible, i.e., r ≈ q. The challenge faced by cryptanalysts is to devise faster ECDLP solvers for such curves. This has been accomplished for some special classes of elliptic curves, including those for which the order of q modulo r is small [4, 17] , and for prime-field anomalous curves [22] [23] [24] .
Recently Gaudry [8] used an index-calculus approach to solve the ECDLP on curves defined over F q n where n is composite. His method is asymptotically faster than Pollard's rho method when n is divisible by a small number greater than 2. For example, if 3|n, then the running time of Gaudry's algorithm is O(q 10n/21+ ), whereas Pollard's rho method has a running time of O(q n/2+ ). However, it has yet to be determined whether Gaudry's algorithm is indeed faster than Pollard's rho method for finite fields of sizes that might be deployed in practice, namely where q n ∈ [2 160 , 2 600 ].
Weil descent
Frey [3] first proposed using Weil descent as a means to reduce the ECDLP in elliptic curves over extension fields F q n to the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the jacobian variety J C (F q ) of an algebraic curve C of genus g ≥ 2 over the proper subfield F q of F q n . The hope was that index-calculus techniques could then be employed to solve the DLP in J C (F q ) significantly faster than it takes Pollard's rho method to solving the original ECDLP instance in E(F q ). Later, Gaudry, Hess and Smart (GHS) [9] showed how Frey's methodology could be implemented in the case where the characteristic of F q n is 2 to obtain a hyperelliptic curve C. Their reduction was cryptographically significant because subexponential-time index-calculus algorithms are known [1, 7, 2] for solving the DLP in the jacobians of hyperelliptic curves. The GHS attack was shown to be ineffective in the case F q n = F 2 N where N ∈ [160, 600] is prime [18] . The case where N ∈ [160, 600] is composite was studied in [16] , and the elliptic curves most susceptible to the GHS attack were identified and enumerated. Menezes, Teske and Weng [19] provided an exact (non-asymptotic) analysis of the GHS attack for the case F q n = F 2 5l . They showed that these fields were weak in the sense that any instance of the ECDLP for any elliptic curve over these fields can be solved in significantly less time than it takes Pollard's rho method to solve the hardest instances. For example, the speedup for the case F q n = F 2 600 is by a factor of 2 69 . We emphasize that the ECDLP over fields F 2 5l with l ∈ [32, 120] is still intractable using existing computer technology (otherwise we would call these fields bad). Nevertheless, the results are cryptographically meaningful because they provide some evidence that the fields F 2 5l may be bad and therefore unsuitable for elliptic curve cryptography. graphic implications of this generalized GHS attack. Our objective is to find new examples of weak fields. We stress that we are not interested in families of fields that are asymptotically weak, i.e., where the ECDLP can be solved faster than Pollard's rho method as the field size tends to infinity. Instead, we are interested in fields F 2 N where N ∈ [160, 600] because these are the fields that might be used in practice.
Our analysis is incomplete because the curves C produced by the generalized GHS reduction have not been explicitly described and, in particular, we do not have concrete measures of the cost of performing arithmetic in J C (F q ) and of solving DLP instances in J C (F q ) using index-calculus methods. We do, however, make reasonable assumptions about these costs and argue that our conclusions are cryptographically meaningful (cf. §3.3). If a field is found to be weak under these assumptions, then we call the field potentially weak. We call a field F 2 N (potentially) partially weak if the ECDLP for only a non-negligible proportion of all elliptic curves over F 2 N can be solved significantly faster than it takes Pollard's rho method to solve the hardest instances (under the aforementioned assumptions). By 'non-negligible proportion', we mean something like one-half or one-quarter. If a field can be shown to be (potentially) partially weak, then one could reasonably suspect that the field is (potentially) weak and therefore unsuitable for elliptic curve cryptography.
Subject to these assumptions, our results are the following:
( 
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Hess' generalized GHS attack is outlined in §2. §3 summarizes the running time of Pollard's rho method and the Enge-Gaudry algorithm, and discusses our assumptions about J C (F q ). §4 reviews material on computing isogenies between elliptic curves. The vulnerability of the fields F 2 7l , F 2 6l and F 2 3l to the generalized GHS attack are examined in § §5, 6 and 7, respectively. The results for F 2 210 are summarized in §8. The remaining cases F 2 N where N is not divisible by 3, 6 or 7 are considered in §9. We draw our conclusions in §10 and list some open problems.
Notation
Let l and n be positive integers, and let N = ln. Let q = 2 l , and let k = F q and K = F q n . For a subfield K 1 = F q s of K where s|n, the relative trace function 
The set of all such representatives is denoted by E. The subset of curves E a,b ∈ E with Tr(a) = 0 (resp. Tr(a) = 1) is denoted E 0 (resp. E 1 ).
Generalized GHS Weil descent attack
Consider the elliptic curve E = E a,b ∈ E. We assume that #E(K) = dr where r is prime and d is small, whence r ≈ q n . These are the elliptic curves of interest in cryptographic applications 1 . Let P ∈ E(K) be a point of order r.
If Tr(a) = 1, then we further assume that
Via a birational transformation the defining equation of E can be brought into the form y 2 + y = γ 1 /x + a + γ 2 x. Then Hess' generalization [13, Theorems 11, 12] of the GHS reduction constructs an explicit group homomorphism
where C is a curve defined over k of genus
Remark 1 (generalized GHS versus GHS)
The generalized GHS reduction specializes to the GHS reduction [9] by selecting γ 1 = 1 and
then C is a hyperelliptic curve of genus g where
1 In particular, we are not interested in subfield curves, i.e., elliptic curves E defined over K whose isomorphism class has a representative E a,b such that L = F 2 (a, b) is a proper subfield of K. For such curves, #E(L)|#E(K) and hence the ECDLP in E(K) can already be solved in significantly fewer than √ q n steps.
Generalized GHS attack
The procedure for finding λ = log P Q where P is a point of order r on the elliptic curve E a,b , and Q ∈ P , is the following:
3. Use the generalized GHS reduction [13] to construct a curve C and map the points
Remark 2 (selection of n, γ 1 and γ 2 ) The parameters n, γ 1 , γ 2 should be selected so that the running time of the best DLP solver for J C (k) is minimized. Since #J C (k) ≈ q g and J C (k) should contain a subgroup of order r ≈ q n , we also require that g ≥ n. In the ideal situation, we would have g ≈ n because then #J C (k) ≈ #E(K). Note that since Ord γ 1 and Ord γ 2 are divisors of X n + 1, we have t ≤ n and g ≤ 2 n − 1. Thus, the optimum selection of n, γ 1 , and γ 2 will depend on the degrees of the irreducible factors of X n + 1 over F 2 over all divisors n ≥ 2 of N.
Remark 3 (efficiency of determining an optimal decomposition
2 ) Once optimum choices for Ord γ 1 and Ord γ 2 have been identified, an efficient test is required for determining whether a given b has a decomposition b = (γ 1 γ 2 ) 2 , and if so, such γ 1 , γ 2 have to be computed. In § §5, 6, 7 and 9.2 we present solutions to this problem in special cases of particular interest.
Remark 4 (efficiency of determining C and φ) The running time complexity of the algorithms in [13] for finding the defining equation of C and for computing φ has not been determined. However, if n is relatively small, as will be the case in § §5-9, then this time will be dominated by the time it takes to solve the DLP in J C (k). Hence our analyses will ignore the running times for computing C and φ.
Analysis of discrete logarithm algorithms

Pollard's rho method
The instances of the ECDLP over F 2 N most resistant to Pollard's rho method are for elliptic curves E that have almost prime order #E(F 2 N ) = 2r for some prime r. Since r ≈ 2 N −1 , Pollard's rho method has an expected running time of
steps, where the dominant operation in each step is an addition in E(F 2 N ). When mixed affine-projective coordinates are employed, an elliptic curve operation requires 8 multiplications in F 2 N . Thus the expected running time of Pollard's rho method is R ρ ≈ c N 2 0.5(N +5) , where c N is the cost of a multiplication in F 2 N . Since we will only be concerned with rough (but reasonably good) approximations, we will ignore the factor c N and henceforth use the estimate
Enge-Gaudry index-calculus algorithm
Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus g defined over k = F q = F 2 l . The EngeGaudy algorithm [7, 2] is a subexponential-time index-calculus method for solving the DLP in J C (F q ). First, a factor base of size w is chosen. For curves of low genus, the factor base will consist of (half) of all degree one divisors in J C (F q ), so w ≈ q/2. Next, in the relation generation stage, slightly more than w linear relations of factor base elements are found. The expected running time of this stage is R RG ≈ (c J +c S ) q 2 g!, where c J is the cost of an addition in J C (F q ), and c S is the cost of testing whether a monic polynomial a(u) ∈ F q [u] of degree (at most) g is 1-smooth. As discussed in [19] , the cost c J has experimentally been found to be less than c S for the values of g and F q of interest in this paper. The dominant computation in smoothness testing is the evaluation of u 
Ignoring the cost of a multiplication in F 2 l , we get the estimate
Finally, a linear system of dimension slightly more than w and having about g non-zero coefficients per equation is solved using Lanczos' algorithm. This linear algebra stage has running time R LA ≈ c r gq 2 
4
, where c r is cost of a multiplication modulo an N-bit integer. We will henceforth ignore the factor c r and use the approximation
3.3 Hess' index-calculus algorithm
Suppose now that C is a curve of genus g over k = F q = F 2 l that was the result of Hess' generalized GHS reduction (see §2). The curve C is in general not hyperelliptic. This makes an exact analysis of the generalized GHS attack difficult for two reasons.
The first is that a precise cost of performing arithmetic in J C (k) is not known. Hess' algorithm [11] for performing an addition in J C (k) takes O(g 4 ) k-operations, which is slower than Cantor's algorithm for hyperelliptic curves which takes O(g 2 ) k-operations. In our analyses, we will make the following assumption.
Assumption A Let C be a (non-hyperelliptic) curve that is produced by the generalized GHS reduction. The cost of an addition operation in J C (k) is approximately the same as the cost of an addition operation in the case that C is hyperelliptic.
The second difficulty is that good estimates of the running times of index-calculus algorithms for solving the DLP in J C (k) are not available. Hess' algorithm [12] has a subexponential running time of O(L q g [ 1 2 ]), where
, but an exact analysis has not been done. Nevertheless, when analyzing the generalized GHS attack, we will make the following assumption.
Assumption B Let C be a (non-hyperelliptic) curve that is produced by the generalized GHS reduction. The cost of finding discrete logarithms in J C (k) is approximately the same as the cost of the Enge-Gaudry algorithm in the case that C is hyperelliptic.
Under these assumptions, the expected time so solve an instance of the DLP in J C (k) is R RG + R LA , where R RG , R LA are as defined in (6), (7).
Remark 5 (reasonableness of Assumptions A and B)
One would expect that the best algorithms for adding in J C (k) and computing logarithms are significantly slower (and certainly not any faster) when C is non-hyperelliptic than the algorithms when C is hyperelliptic. However, the conclusions drawn in this paper under Assumptions A and B remain valid even if the non-hyperelliptic algorithms were several orders of magnitude slower than their hyperelliptic counterparts. Thus we maintain that our results about the potential weakness or potential partial weakness of a field are meaningful in practice.
Random walks in isogeny classes of elliptic curves
Two elliptic curves E, E ∈ E are said to be isogenous (over K) if #E(K) = #E (K); we write E ∼ E . The equivalence classes with respect to isogeny are called isogeny classes.
Suppose now that W ⊂ E is a set of elliptic curves that are vulnerable to the generalized GHS attack, and suppose that E ∈ W. A strategy, first proposed by Galbraith, Hess and Smart [6] , for attacking an ECDLP instance for E is to find an elliptic curve E ∈ W that is isogenous to E, and then map the ECDLP instance to E using an isogeny ψ : E → E .
One approach for finding E is to perform a random walk in the set of elliptic curves isogenous to E. For each elliptic curve E encountered in this walk, we must be able to efficiently determine whether E ∈ W. In the remainder of this section, we outline the random walk method from [6] (see also [19] ). The problem of deciding whether E ∈ W is tackled in § §5-9 for particular choices of W.
Recall that t = q n + 1 − #E(K) is the trace of E, and = t 2 − 4 · q n its discriminant. The endomorphism ring End(E) of E is an order in the maximal order O of the imaginary quadratic number field Q( √ ). More precisely, Z[π] ⊆ End(E) ⊆ O, where π : E → E is the q n -th power Frobenius map on E. The endomorphism class of E, denoted by C(E), is the set of all isogenous, non-isomorphic curves E with End(E) = End(E ).
For any elliptic curve E ∈ E we can use an algorithm of Kohel [15] to compute a chain of isogenies defined over K from E to an elliptic curve E ∈ E with End(E ) = O. This takes running time O(s 3 ), where s is the largest prime dividing
] is small and smooth so that Kohel's algorithm takes negligible time compared to the other steps of the generalized GHS attack considered in § §5-9. For the following, we therefore may assume that End(E) is maximal. Then there is one-to-one correspondence between C(E) and the ideal class group Cl of the maximal order O.
In our random walk, we have to make the following heuristic assumption about the distribution of vulnerable curves among endomorphism classes.
Assumption C Let X ⊆ E be the set of elliptic curves that belong to an isogeny class of some curve in W, and let
Remark 6 (restriction of Assumption C) Of course, Assumption C is not accurate if #E(K) lies at the extreme ends of the Hasse interval, or if has a very large square factor; in either case #C(E) = #Cl is very small. However, the former affects only a very small fraction of the elliptic curves over K, while the latter is most unlikely for non-subfield curves.
Given a curve E ∈ X , it is now possible to compute a curve E ∈ W isogenous to E along with a chain of low-degree isogenies from E to E . This is based on ideas from [6] to simulate a random walk in the endomorphism class of E, exploiting the aforementioned one-to-one correspondence between Cl and C(E). The random walk works as follows: correspond to the multiplication of a fixed ideal, say O, by the two prime ideals ᒍ 1 and ᒍ 2 lying over p. As explained in [6] , it is easy to determine whether j 1 corresponds to ᒍ 1 or ᒍ 2 . Now, let P be the set of the 16 smallest odd primes p such that p = 1, and such that the pairs of ideal classes corresponding to the prime ideals lying over p are pairwise distinct in Cl. A pseudo-random walk (E i ) in C(E) is defined as follows:
i−1 , and compute the two roots in K of p (j, X); let j be one of these roots, and let b i = (j ) −1 . Simultaneously a chain (ᑾ i ) of ideals in Cl is computed such that for each index i, the ideal ᑾ i corresponds to the isogeny mapping E to E i .
Based on [25] , and on extensive experimental evidence in this particular application, the choice of P is so that the walk (E i ) simulates a random walk in the endomorphism class of E. Also, considering 20000 randomly chosen discriminants of various bitlengths, we found that max{p ∈ P} < 313 for all cases. Thus, each random walk step takes on average up to about 1 3 
operations in K, given that computing the roots of the modular polynomial is by far the most time-consuming step. Now, under Assumption C, after expected 2 v random-walk steps in C(E) an elliptic curve E ∈ W is encountered that is isogenous to E. Thus, altogether it takes something on the order of (8) operations in K to find a curve in W isogenous to a given curve, along with an ideal ᑾ that represents the isogeny between the two curves. We note that this step can be efficiently parallelized.
The remaining steps to compute the explicit isogeny between E and E are identical with Stages 2 and 3 of [6] : index-calculus techniques are used to represent ᑾ as a product of just a few ideals of small norm, and finally Vélu's formulae are applied. This can be accomplished in time O (2 N/4+ε ). Since this time is less than the expected running time of the random walk for the scenarios in this paper, the time to compute the isogeny will be ignored.
Remark 7 (further speed-up of the random walk)
The analysis above is generous since, for example, for more than half of all randomly chosen discriminants, only primes ≤ 157 were needed to generate a set P of 16 split primes. Working with max{p ∈ P} = 157 yields a gain of a factor 3.6. In case P contains primes larger than 157, one might want to choose not to use those primes as often as the smaller primes, or not to use them at all. This may require slightly more random walk steps to find a curve E ∈ W, but the steps are cheaper on average. Also, using Karatsuba arithmetic to compute the roots of p (j, X) may accelerate this step by another factor of 10 for the larger primes.
The case n = 7
Suppose now that n = 7, N = 7l, K = F 2 7l , q = 2 l , and k = F q . The factorization of X 7 + 1 over F 2 is:
We argue that the fields F 2 7l are potentially partially weak for elliptic curve cryptography by showing that the set X of all non-subfield curves in E 0 are (potentially) vulnerable to the generalized GHS attack.
5.1 Elliptic curves over F 2 7l with Tr(a) = 0 Let W 0 be the set of elliptic curves E a,b ∈ E 0 with b = (γ 1 γ 2 ) 2 , where either
For each E ∈ W 0 we have s 1 = s 2 = t = 3, and hence the generalized GHS reduction with n = 7 yields a curve C of genus g = 7 over
Our strategy for solving an instance of the ECDLP on a given elliptic curve E a,b ∈ X is the following:
(1) Use Kohel's algorithm to compute a chain of isogenies defined over K to an elliptic curve E ∈ E 0 with End(E ) = O. (2) Perform a random walk in the set of elliptic curves isogenous to E until an elliptic curve E ∈ W 0 is found, and compute the corresponding isogeny between E and E . Steps 1, 2 and 3 were outlined in §4, while steps 4 and 5 were considered in §2 and §3, respectively. To complete the description and analysis of step 2, we need to provide an algorithm for deciding whether an elliptic curve is in W 0 , and to estimate the expected number of random walk steps.
Decomposition algorithm
2 and either Ord
or Ord γ 1 = Ord γ 2 = X 3 + X 2 + 1; or "failure".
( Note that step 2e or step 3f in Algorithm 8 will be executed exactly once in the random walk (see §4). Thus the time to solve the DLP instance in F * q 7 will not be a bottleneck in the generalized GHS attack. Moreover, Algorithm 8 with the exclusion of steps 2e and 3f takes less time than a random walk step. Thus, we will ignore the cost of Algorithm 8 in our analysis.
Theorem 10 Algorithm 8 outputs
2 and either The rest of the proof is similar to that for step 2.
Remark 11 (an alternative decomposition algorithm) Hess [14, Lemma 17] describes a decomposition method that for given β ∈ F q n computes γ 1 , γ 2 such that β = γ 1 γ 2 and Ord γ 1 = Ord γ 2 = X r 1 + X r 2 + 1 where r 1 > r 2 > 0 and gcd(r 2 , n) = 1. This method is advantageous over Algorithm 8 since it uses Lagrange resolvents to compute γ 1 from a root of w(u) (cf. steps 2e and 3f), thus avoiding having to solve a DLP in F * q n .
Expected number of random walk steps
We will argue heuristically that #B = (q 3 − 1)(q 2 + q + 2)/2. For this, let
q , and (γ 1 , γ 2 ) and (λγ 1 , λ −1 γ 2 ) represent the same β ∈ B. Thus, #B ≤ T 2 /(q − 1). Further, (γ 1 , γ 2 ) and (γ 2 , γ 1 ) always represent the same β ∈ B. Now assume γ 1 γ 2 = δ 1 δ 2 with γ 1 , γ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ A and γ 1 = λδ 1 , λδ 2 for all λ ∈ F * q . Let λ ∈ F q 7 \ F q such that δ 1 = λγ 1 . For a given γ 1 , there are q 3 − q values λ ∈ F q 7 \ F q such that λ γ 1 ∈ A. But then for the particular λ, it is highly unlikely that λ −1 γ 2 is also in A, given that the proportion q 3 /q 7 is extremely small. Thus, heuristically, the only repeated representations of β = γ 1 γ 2 for (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ∈ A × A are of the form β = (λγ 1 )(λ −1 γ 2 ) or β = γ 2 γ 1 . To estimate the effect on #B caused by symmetries, we call two pairs (γ 1 , γ 2 ), (δ 1 , δ 2 ) ∈ A × A equivalent if there exists λ ∈ F * q such that γ 1 = λδ 1 and γ 2 = λ −1 δ 2 . This is an equivalence relation, and there are T 2 /(q − 1) equivalence classes. Let G be such an equivalence class. Now, if (γ , γ ) ∈ G for some γ ∈ A, then for any (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ∈ G we have (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ∼ (γ 2 , γ 1 ). There are T such classes, which altogether make up T distinct values b ∈ B. On the other hand, if G does not contain a pair (γ , γ ), then, if
Along with the heuristic explanation above, this yields #B
(This has been confirmed experimentally for N = 7, 14, 21.)
The same holds for the case Ord γ = X 3 + X 2 + 1. However, there may or may not be a significant overlap for the two corresponding sets B. We therefore simply estimate #W 0 ≈ q 5 /2. Consequently, under Assumption C, expected 2q 2 random walk steps in the endomorphism class of an elliptic curve E ∈ X need to be executed until a curve E ∈ W 0 is found.
Analysis
For selected values of N, Table 1 compares the expected running time R ρ (see equation (5)) for solving the ECDLP in an elliptic curve in X with the running times R RG , R LA , R W (see equations (6), (7), (8)) of the dominant stages of the generalized GHS attack. The values R RG , R LA are for hyperelliptic curves, so Assumptions A and B are in effect. The value for R W relies on Assumption C. Since R W R ρ , we conclude that the fields F 2 7l are potentially partially weak. Note that R RG R W , so the veracity of our conclusion remains unchanged even if DLP algorithms for 161  23  83  43  47  69  210  30  108  51  61  84  301  43  153  64  87  110  399  57  202  79  115  139  497  71  251  93  143  167  595  85  300  107  171  195 the non-hyperelliptic curve C are significantly slower than their hyperelliptic curve counterparts. 
Elliptic curves over
For each E ∈ W 1 we have s 1 = 3, s 2 = 4, t = 4, and hence the generalized GHS reduction with n = 7 yields a curve C of genus g = 14 over F 2 l . Under assumptions A and B, the DLP in J C (F 2 l ) can be solved significantly faster than Pollard's rho method. Now, we expect that #W 1 ≈ q 6 . Hence to attack a given non-subfield elliptic curve in E 1 , one expects to perform about q random walk steps in an isogeny class before a curve in W 1 is encountered. Unfortunately, we were unable to devise an efficient algorithm for deciding whether an element b ∈ F 2 7l admits a decomposition b = (γ 1 γ 2 ) 2 with γ 1 , γ 2 satisfying the above conditions (and to find such a decomposition if it exists). The running time of such an algorithm would have to be significantly less than q 2.5 , otherwise the random walk would be slower than Pollard's rho method for solving the original ECDLP instance.
Thus we do not have any arguments to support the weakness of all elliptic curves in E 1 under the generalized GHS attack with n = 7.
The case n = 6
When n is composite, the following result due to Hess [14, Lemma 14] (see also [19] ) is very useful in finding the required decompositions. Here, denotes the Euler phi function for polynomials. For a divisor m(X) ∈ F 2 [X] of X n + 1, (m(X)) is the number of elements γ ∈ F q n with Ord γ = m(X).
Theorem 12 Let
Ord γ 1 |(X n 1 + 1) and Ord γ 2 | (X + 1)(X n + 1)
2 We cannot take
l , and k = F q . We give two arguments for the potential weakness of the fields F 2 6l .
The factorization of X 6 + 1 over F 2 is:
Let W be the set of elliptic curves E a,b ∈ E over F q 6 with b = (γ 1 γ 2 ) 2 , where Ord γ 1 = X 3 + 1 and Ord γ 2 = (X + 1)(X 3 + 1). For each E ∈ W we have s 1 = 3 and s 2 = t = 4, and so the generalized GHS reduction with n = 6 yields a curve C of genus 14 over F q . Note also that Tr K/K 1 (b) = 0. This is because
then Tr K/K 1 (γ 2 ) = 0, and hence Ord γ 2 |(X 3 + 1) which is not possible.
Proof Let
Note that E a,b ∈ W if and only if b 1/2 ∈ B. Also, #A 1 = (q − 1)(q 2 − 1) and #A 2 = (q 2 − q)(q 2 − 1). It follows from Theorem 12(iv) with n 1 = 3 that
2 . By Theorem 12(ii) with n 1 = 3, we have Ord γ 1 |X 3 +1 and Ord γ 2 |(X +1)(X 3 + 1). Suppose first that E ∈ W. Then we can write β = δ 1 δ 2 with Ord δ 1 = X 3 + 1 and Ord
and so E ∈ W. 162  27  84  74  56  210  35  108  82  72  300  50  153  98  102  402  67  204  115  136  498  83  252  131  168  600  100  303  149  202 Given a non-subfield curve E ∈ E, Theorem 13 can be used to efficiently decide whether E ∈ W in which case the generalized GHS reduction can be applied. In the rare event that E ∈ W, proceeding just as outlined in §5.1 yields an isogenous curve E ∈ W in just a few random walk steps. Table 2 gives the time estimates for solving the DLP in J C (F 2 l ) under Assumptions A and B, leading to our conclusion that the fields F 2 6l are potentially weak. Now let W be the set of elliptic curves E a,b ∈ E for which b can be written [19] , this implies that #E(F q 6 ) ≡ 0 (mod 8) if Tr(a) = 0. So let X be the set of all non-subfield elliptic curves E ∈ E over F q 6 with #E(F q 6 ) ≡ 0 or 2 (mod 8). Then #X ≈ q 6 . Using the above decomposition, for E ∈ W we have s 1 = 2, s 2 = t = 4, so that the generalized GHS reduction with n = 6 yields a curve C of genus 12. Combined with random walks in isogeny classes (under Assumption C, with #W/#X ≈ 2 −(l−1) ), we obtain that the curves in X are particularly (potentially) vulnerable to the generalized GHS attack, which further supports the conclusion that the fields F 2 6l are potentially weak (cf. Table 3 ).
The case n = 3
Suppose now that n = 3, N = 3l, K = F 2 3l , q = 2 l , and k = F q . We show that the fields F 2 3l are partially weak.
We have X 3 + 1 = (X + 1)(X 2 + X + 1). Let W be the set of elliptic curves E a,b ∈ E over F 2 3l with b = (γ 1 γ 2 ) 2 , where Ord γ 1 = X+1 and Ord γ 2 = X 2 +X+1. For each E ∈ W we have s 1 = 1, s 2 = 2 and t = 3, so that the generalized GHS reduction with n = 3 produces a curve C of genus g = 3 over F q . In fact, in this 
Tr(a) = 0. Let X be the set of all non-subfield elliptic curves E ∈ E over F q 3 with #E(F q 3 ) ≡ 0 (mod 8) or 2 (mod 8). Then #X ≈ q 3 . Now, given an instance of the ECDLP on a given curve E a,b ∈ X , we proceed just as outlined in §5.1, where the algorithm for deciding whether an elliptic curve is in W is replaced by the check for b
Under Assumption C, for a given curve E ∈ X \ W it takes expected q/2 random walk steps in the isogeny class of E to find a curve in W.
Gaudry, Thériault and Thomé's [10] double-large prime variant of the indexcalculus algorithm for computing the logarithms in a genus 3 hyperelliptic curve C over F q has running time O(q 4/3+ ). Their experiments confirm that the algorithm is indeed faster in practice than Pollard's rho method (which has a running time of O(q 1.5 )) even for rather small jacobian sizes, such as #J C (F q ) ≈ 2 81 . Thus, finite fields F 2 3l should be considered partially weak.
The field F 2 210
The field K = F 2 210 is interesting for ECC implementations because its arithmetic can be efficiently implemented by successive extensions, e.g., F 2 2 ⊆ F 2 6 ⊆ F 2 30 ⊆ F 2 210 . In [19] , the following evidence was given for the weakness of F 2 210 for ECC. For this field, we have R ρ ≈ 2 108 .
(1) For (essentially) all elliptic curves over F 2 210 , the GHS reduction with n = 5 yields a hyperelliptic curve of genus 15 140 of all curves in E, the GHS reduction with n = 3 produces a genus 3 hyperelliptic curve C over F 2 70 . Random walks in isogeny classes can then be used to reduce the ECDLP in all elliptic curves E ∈ E with #E(F 2 210 ) ≡ 0 or 2 (mod 8) to the DLP in a genus 3 hyperelliptic curve. The Gaudry-Thérialut-Thomé index-calculus algorithm can solve the latter problem in time significantly less than R ρ .
9 The case n = 3, 6, 7
In this section we examine the weakness of fields F q n with n = 3, 6, 7 under the generalized GHS attack.
First observe that just as with the GHS attack, for each field F q n the set of possible genera of the curves over F q produced by the generalized GHS reduction is completely determined by the factorization of the polynomial X n + 1 over F 2 . Consequently, for most fields F q n one would expect that the smallest (useful) genera that can be obtained by both attacks are approximately the same.
For each n, we search for a class W of vulnerable elliptic curves. Note #W/#E cannot be negligibly small because otherwise the random walk in an isogeny class will be infeasible. 0) . In either case, the generalized GHS reduction with n = N produces a curve C over F 2 of genus g = 2 d −1. Since d ≥ 16 for prime N ∈ [160, 600], the DLP in J C (F 2 ) will take longer than Pollard's rho method for E(F 2 N ) (even if the curve C were hyperelliptic). Thus the generalized GHS attack fails for all instances of the ECDLP for all elliptic curves over finite fields of prime extension degree.
9.2 The case n = 8
l , and k = F q . We argue that for sufficiently large N, the set X of all non-subfield elliptic curves E over F 2 8l with #E(F 2 8l ) ≡ 0 (mod 8) are vulnerable to the GHS attack and potentially vulnerable to the generalized GHS attack.
Over F 2 , we have X 8 + 1 = (X + 1) 8 . Let W be the set of elliptic curves E a,b ∈ E 0 over F q 8 with b = (γ 1 γ 2 ) 2 , where Ord γ 1 = X 2 + 1 and Ord
For each E ∈ W we have s 1 = 2 and s 2 = t = 5, and the generalized GHS reduction with n = 8 yields a curve C of genus 24 over F q .
Theorem 14 Let
Proof Let Since γ 1 ∈ F q , we have γ q 4 2 + γ 2 = 0, so Ord γ 2 |(X + 1) 4 which is a contradiction. Therefore, Ord b = (X + 1) 6 . To show the converse, simply observe that there are q 6 − q 5 elements b ∈ F q 8 with Ord b = (X + 1) 6 . Thus, any such b must be in B.
For E a,b ∈ W we thus have Tr K/k (b) = 0 and hence Tr(b) = 0. By Lemma 7 of [19] , this implies that #E(F 2 8l ) ≡ 0 (mod 8).
If b ∈ F * and Ord γ 2 |(X + 1) 5 . Since Ord b = (X + 1) 6 , we have that Ord γ 1 |(X 2 + 1) and faster than Pollard's rho method for E(F 2 4l ). Since in fact C is not hyperelliptic, we conclude that fields F 2 4l are not further weakened by the generalized GHS attack with n = 4.
n = 5
We have X 5 +1 = (X +1)(X 4 +X 3 +X 2 +X +1). The best possible choice for the decomposition of b is such that Ord γ 1 = X 4 + X 3 + X 2 + X + 1 and Ord γ 2 = X + 1 (in which case s 1 = 4, s 2 = 1, t = 5), or Ord γ 1 = Ord γ 2 = X 4 + X 3 + X 2 + X + 1 (in which case s 1 = s 2 = t = 4 if Tr(a) = 0). In either case, the generalized GHS reduction with n = 5 produces curves of genus g = 15. Thus the generalized GHS attack does not further weaken the fields F 2 5l over the GHS attack for which any non-subfield elliptic curve over F 2 5l can be reduced to a genus 15 or 16 hyperelliptic curve over F 2 l [19] .
n = 9
For any non-subfield elliptic curve defined over F 2 9l , the smallest possible genus obtained by the generalized GHS reduction with n = 9 is g = 63; this can be achieved by taking Ord γ 1 = X 6 + X 3 + 1 and Ord γ 2 = X + 1. The smallest genus obtained by the GHS reduction with n = 9 is also g = 63. In either case, this does not yield an ECDLP solver that is faster than Pollard's rho method.
n = 10
For any non-subfield elliptic curve defined over F 2 10l , the smallest achievable genus for the generalized GHS reduction with n = 10 is g = 32 (by taking Ord γ 1 = (X 5 + 1)(X + 1) and Ord γ 2 = X + 1). This is no improvement over the GHS reduction with n = 10.
11 ≤ n ≤ 300
Continuing in this way, we checked all remaining values upto n = 300. We found that for all fields F q n with 9 ≤ n ≤ 300 only at most a small proportion of elliptic curves over F 2 nl succumb to the generalized GHS attack with descent degree n. For some n, these proportions are slightly larger than for the GHS attack, but they are still negligibly small (and also the curves are not hyperelliptic).
Conclusions
We examined the weakness of characteristic two finite fields under Hess' generalized GHS attack. The only new fields found to exhibit any weaknesses are the fields F 2 3l which are partially weak, the fields F 2 6l which are potentially weak, and the fields F 2 7l and F 2 8l which are potentially partially weak. These results strongly suggest that finite fields F 2 N where N is divisible by 3, 5, 6, 7 or 8, should not be used to implement elliptic curve cryptographic protocols.
An outstanding task is to characterize the curves produced by the generalized GHS reduction, and to exactly analyze their best DLP solvers. Another open problem is to determine whether the elliptic curves E a,b over F 2 7l with Tr(a) = 1 are (potentially) weak.
